Podcast: The mediation process (Foreclosure Fairness Act)
Image: FreeDigitalPhotos.net
Image: FreeDigitalPhotos.net
In June 7, 2012, the Foreclosure Fairness Act changed regarding when a mediation demand submission may be accepted. It states the following: (SHB 2614, Sec. 5)
A housing counselor or attorney assisting a borrower may refer the borrower tomediation, pursuant to RCW 61.24.163, if the housing counselor or attorney determines that mediation is appropriate based on the individual circumstances and the borrower has received a notice of default. The referral to mediation may be made any time after a notice of default has been issued but no later than twenty days after the date a notice of sale has been recorded.
In this podcast, Rob Dickson explains the basic definition of an easement.
In this podcast, Rob Dickson describes how the new Foreclosure Fairness Act has impacted foreclosures in Washington. (Photo Credit: jscreationzs)
In this podcast, Rob Dickson discusses the difference between non-recourse and recourse loans and how they effect foreclosures in Washington State.
Washington has a very streamlined legal process for landlords to evict a tenant called an unlawful detainer action (assuming, of course, that the landlord is justified in doing so). RCW 59.12.030 defines unlawful detainer, and outlines many of the grounds for eviction. Because the unlawful detainer action simplifies and expedites the eviction process for the landlord, Washington has very specific statutory rules that landlords (and their attorneys) must follow in order for the eviction to be effective. Proper notice and proper service on the tenant are essential parts of an unlawful detainer action.
Notice
Before the landlord can begin the actual legal action against the tenant, notice must first be given to the tenant to vacate the premises for reasons stated in RCW 59.12.030. To do so, the landlord must follow one of three options outlined in RCW 59.12.040 by either (1) leaving a copy of such notice with the tenant personally, or (2) leaving a copy with a person at the residence and also sending a copy via mail to the residence, or (3) posting a copy in a conspicuous place at the residence, leaving a copy with anyone at the residence, and sending a copy via mail to the residence. As a practical matter, it would be wise to document each step in this process to prove compliance with this procedure, which is usually done by affidavit.
If the tenant does vacate the premises, the landlord can immediately take possession of the premises and, pursuant to RCW 59.18.310, can seek to recover from the tenant outstanding rent owed, if any. If the tenant left behind personal property at the premises, look here for a discussion on what the landlord may or must do.
Commencing the Action (Summons and Complaint)
If the tenant does not vacate the premises, an unlawful detainer legal action is required to effectively evict the tenant. To begin, just like in any other civil action, the landlord must file a summons and complaint (or, better yet, have an attorney do so). If rent is owed, the complaint should provide the amount. The summons must state, among other things, the timeframe within which the tenant must respond. See RCW 59.12.080; RCW 59.18.365. In other civil actions, the timeframe is typically 20 days, but because this action is more streamlined, RCW 59.12.070 allows a landlord to require response within as few as seven days (although no more than thirty days).
To properly serve the defendant with the summon and complaint, the same process is required for service as in other civil actions, see RCW 59.18.365, which generally requires personal service, or if the court allows, by publication.
Show Cause Hearing
Along with the summons and complaint, the landlord can also obtain from the court, and serve on the tenant, an order requiring the tenant to appear in court at a show cause hearing. See RCW 59.18.370. Conveniently, the timeframe for the tenant to appear at this hearing can be exactly the same as the timeframe as required for the tenant to respond to the summons and complaint (i.e., within as few as seven days, but no more than thirty days). What makes this hearing so useful for the landlord is that, at the hearing, the burden is on the tenant, rather than the landlord, to show cause (or prove) why the property should not be restored to the landlord. This hearing is the most expeditious way for the landlord to retake possession of the premises because, if the tenant cannot do so, or if the tenant fails to appear altogether, then the court will typically order the sheriff to restore property to the landlord. The court may also grant to the landlord other requests made in the complaint, such as payment of outstanding rent.
Photo credit: renjith krishnan
According to a recent Washington Post article by Howard Schneider, the International Monetary Fund is pushing for lenders in the United States to agree to principal reductions on their existing loans.
As a general rule, banks are very (VERY) reluctant to reduce principal reductions. It will be interesting to see if these types of pressures, from international organizations to be exact, will actually have an effect on the loan modification strategies that US lending institutions currently follow.
Here’s a quote from the article:
“International Monetary Fund chief Christine Lagarde called on the U.S. government to reduce the mortgage debt owed by homeowners as a way help to revive the nation’s economy and stimulate growth in the wider industrialized world.
Speaking Thursday at the Brookings Institution, Lagarde urged that this relief be extended to loans held by mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The issue of whether to reduce mortgages held by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, representing more than half of U.S. home loans, has become contentious in Washington in recent months.
Ahead of the IMF’s spring meetings next week, agency analysts have been warning that household debt — in particular, mortgages that are in default or that exceed the value of the borrower’s home — is dragging down growth in developed countries at a time when the global economy is struggling to revive.”
Photo: renjith krishnan
Photo credit: ddpavumba
Whenever you find yourself dealing with a contractor, you will also find yourself dealing with that contractor’s bond almost without exception. Under Washington statute Title 18, general contractors and subcontractors alike are required to file evidence of a surety bond with the Department of Labor and Industries of Washington State. RCW 18.27.040 (general contractor bond must be in the amount of $12,000 and a subcontractor or “specialty” contractor bond must be in the amount of $6,000). The statute’s purpose is “to afford protection to the public including all persons, firms and corporations furnishing labor, materials, or equipment to a contractor from unreliable, fraudulent, financially irresponsible, or incompetent contractors.” RCW 18.27.140. It is a misdemeanor for a contractor to work without first being registered pursuant to the statute. RCW 18.27.020(2)(a).
The mandatory contractor’s bond requirement is important to potential litigants because any person who may file a claim against the contractor is also permitted to specifically name the surety bond as a party to the suit. Of course, naming the bond involves particular pleading requirements in order to comply with the statute. When done right this statute can secure you an increasingly rare award as part of the recovery: YOUR ATTORNEYS’ FEES!! See RCW 18.27.040(6). Such statutes are quite in the opposite of the general rule that each party in a civil action is responsible for paying its own attorneys’ fees and costs. In re Impoundment of Chevrolet Truck, 148 Wn.2d 145, 160, 60 P.3d 53 (2002) (commonly referred to as the “American rule”). In an effort to put some teeth in the statute, Washington legislators expressly included that attorneys’ fees were a possible award to bona fide litigants.
However, the statute has been subject to some scrutiny in recent caselaw from several levels of the State’s judiciary in recent months. The contractor’s registration statute was thoroughly examined in Cosmopolitan Engin. Group, Inc. v. Ondeo Degremont, Inc., 159 Wn.2d 292, 149 P.3d 666 (2006). In that case, one litigant claimed that the contractor’s bond statute allowed the prevailing party to recover its attorneys’ fees from both the contractor and the surety bond itself. Id. at 298. In undertaking its statutory interpretation of RCW 18.27.040, the Court deduced that the placement of the attorneys’ fee provision, when considering the statutory scheme in its entirety, refers “only to action for recovery against the contractor’s bond. Id. at 299. Hence, the Court limited recovery of attorneys’ fees under this section to the amount of the contractor’s bond due to its precise placement in the contractor’s bond statute. In apparent dicta, the Court further rationalized its decision based on the legislatures’ failure to expressly identify that attorneys’ fees were available in suit “against the contractor or against the contractor’s bond” independently of one another. Id. at 301. The court’s reasoning makes sense due to the fact that a litigant could not sue a contractor’s bond under the statute without first initiating a claim against the contractor for breach of contract. The Cosmopolitan decision and its authority for limiting an attorney fee award specifically to the amount of the bond was reaffirmed as recently as last December in an appellate decision from Division Three. See Brotherton v. Kralman Steel Structures, Inc., 2011 WL 6822261, *5-9 (Div. 3 2011). Thus, the prospect of pursuing fees from the contractor party seems to be quite settled without much room to argue the alternative.
Cosmopolitan also explained that RCW 18.27.040 is a one-way statute. Id. at 302, n.3. What is meant by “one-way” is that a subcontractor can sue up the chain and recover against the upper tier contractor’s bond, but not vice versa. Id. Such a dynamic allows suppliers to recover against bond rather than resorting to placing a lien on the consumer’s property for a dispute that does not necessarily involve the homeowner at all. Id. (citing Int’l Comm. Collectors, Inc. v. Carver, 99 Wn.2d 302, 308, 661 P.2d 976 (1983); Stewart Carpet Serv., Inc. v. Contractors Bonding & Ins. Co., 105 Wn. 2d 353, 365-66, 715 P.2d 115 (1986)).
Photo Credit: scottchan